THE PARTICULAR AND ENORMOUS DIFFERENCES IN DRUG TRAFFICKING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND MEXICO

In many cases, those who take a position on what kind of policy should be implemented regarding drug trafficking often do so from a place of ignorance and arbitrary associations. The global development of drug trafficking and the particular differences across various countries should compel us to propose policies that are specific yet interconnected.

Border between the United Mexican States and the United States of America

Drug trafficking is a social phenomenon that is drawing increasing attention from political actors, the media, and society at large. This interest is largely due to the real and intangible growth of a phenomenon that projects two major images. The first depicts the State associating with a monster in order to profit, protect itself, and develop alongside it. The second shows that same monster—or a very similar one—with powers and resources, both material and human, superior to those of the State, which it uses to subjugate it. In both images, the projections of the State are negative, while the characteristics assigned to the monster are both real and misleading. To properly characterize a portion of this phenomenon, it is better to analyze the film rather than the photograph.

SCHEMATIZATION OF THE PHENOMENON

Coca base paste is the first material result of a series of chemical processes applied to the coca leaf—the intermediate step before obtaining cocaine hydrochloride. Producing coca base paste requires several tons of coca leaves, harvested from a shrub that has been cultivated since ancient times in the Andean region—Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia—and which only briefly, during the interwar period, was successfully adapted by the Dutch Crown to grow on the island of Java.

Based on the geographic concentration of the plant-based raw materials needed to produce certain drugs—cocaine, heroin, and marijuana—U.S. foreign policy leaders in the 1970s promoted a series of military, judicial, and economic actions with the aim of reducing drug supply and disrupting the trade in the Northern Hemisphere.

Without delving into the well-founded criticisms of the actions the United States carried out during the 1970s and 1980s—many of which violated the sovereignty of several Asian and Latin American countries—U.S. policymakers grounded these actions (and grouped them into several programs) on a schematic classification based on whether the necessary resources for drug production were geographically concentrated or not: countries with vast areas planted with coca bushes, poppies, or cannabis were classified as producer countries. In contrast, countries lacking these raw materials but with high consumption levels relative to the producer countries—and the rest of the world—were defined as consumer countries.

Until the 1970s, the drug trade had interregional characteristics. That began to change when, during that decade, in the same regions where plant-based raw materials are still concentrated today, criminal organizations emerged—namely the Medellín and Cali Cartels—which transformed the cocaine production and trade system into one operating on an industrial scale.

These new organizations had a main objective: to ensure their products became the most in-demand in the growing domestic markets of consumer countries—the United States and most of Western Europe. In response, U.S.-designed programs—executed by national security forces, often with U.S. assistance—sought a first mechanism to halt that process.

Through military interventions—on land and by air—they aimed to destroy as many coca and poppy cultivation areas as possible and disrupt the normal supply of raw materials needed for drug production. The idea was that by reducing the availability of raw materials, drug output would decline and costs would rise. The main goal of this program—forced eradication of illicit crops—was to make production more expensive, which would drive up retail prices and effectively exclude lower-income users from the market.

This goal ultimately failed, mainly because demand for cocaine increased and expanded globally. In the face of this growth, the new criminal organizations incorporated industrial, technological, and chemical developments into the production system to meet the rising demand:

• The problem of increased raw material costs, caused by forced eradication programs, was addressed by the criminal organizations by diversifying their sources of coca leaves or base paste to complete cocaine production;

• To expand production levels—and thereby profit margins— these criminal organizations built large production facilities to guarantee raw material storage, reduce production costs, increase capacity, and lower retail prices, all to quantitatively expand their markets;

• They achieved economies of scale, in part due to rising demand, by incorporating “modern” industrial technology—gasoline-powered trimmers, drying lamps, presses, and gas ovens—as well as a wide range of chemical precursors (such as potassium permanganate, toluene, phosphorus pentachloride, acetic acid, sulfuric acid, acetate, ethyl ether, thionyl chloride, etc.), which enabled them to increase production to meet the growing and widespread demand.

NEW ACTORS AND A NEW SCHEMATIZATION

During the 1980s, criminal organizations emerged or repositioned themselves in Latin America and Europe, acting as logistical and financial intermediaries between the criminal groups operating in cocaine-producing countries and those controlling the North American and European markets.

In Europe, Corsican and Italian criminal organizations expanded their operations, beginning to act as intermediaries for cocaine from South America and heroin from Asia. In Latin America, up until the mid-1980s, Mexican criminal organizations had been primarily involved in trafficking marijuana, heroin, and human beings into the United States. However, due to increased U.S. military pressure in the Caribbean Sea, Colombian criminal organizations abandoned their historic trafficking route and partnered with the Mexican organizations—then centralized under the Guadalajara Cartel—to continue supplying cocaine to the U.S. market.

Mexican criminal groups not only continued trafficking cocaine into the United States, but also sustained their production and trade of marijuana and heroin from the so-called "Golden Triangle"—Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango. However, at the peak of U.S. cocaine demand, these organizations temporarily concentrated their human and material resources on ensuring a steady flow of Colombian cocaine across the border, in exchange for increasingly large sums of money.

The growing involvement of new or restructured criminal organizations in the international drug trade extended to countries like Mexico, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom, among others, transforming these actors into relevant and necessary players for maintaining the flow of illicit goods. This dynamic began to erode the earlier dichotomy of producer countries and consumer countries.

Starting in the 1990s, new facets of this social phenomenon began to emerge: the development of new domestic markets and the increasingly prominent role of intermediary organizations in the international drug trade.

MEXICO, STRATEGIC NODES, AND THE EXTERNAL MARKET

The growing and frequent influx of money Mexican criminal groups received for acting as intermediaries between Colombia and the United States became a catalyst for breaking their dependency on their Colombian counterparts.

With their increasing role as middlemen, the subsequent dismantling of Colombia's cartels—Medellín in 1993 and Cali three years later—further benefited the Mexican organizations. The Guadalajara Cartel not only maintained control over the routes used to bring cocaine into the U.S., but also took control of that country’s domestic market—the largest cocaine market in the world. In 1989, following the arrest of Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, one of the founders and top leaders of the Guadalajara Cartel, the organizations that had emerged from it—Juárez, Sinaloa, Tijuana, and Tamaulipas (Gulf)—began operating with relative interdependence in a climate of violent instability caused by disputes over control of key areas.

Although cocaine remained the most consumed drug in the United States until the early 21st century, the rising demand for methamphetamines and opioids in the U.S., Europe, and other regions made the internal dynamics among Mexican criminal groups increasingly unstable. The resurgence of this sector in the drug market forced Mexican organizations to develop new strategies to boost supply and meet the growing demand for opioids and synthetic drugs:

• In addition to continuing to smuggle cocaine into the U.S., they expanded the cultivation of poppies to increase their supply of opium for heroin production. They also diversified and increased their sources for the chemical precursors required to manufacture synthetic drugs like amphetamines and methamphetamines;

• They established new, small-scale, and technologically advanced laboratories for the production of heroin and methamphetamines throughout Mexican territory. A slow process of relocating some of these labs even began, allowing production to occur directly in the U.S., Europe, and the growing Asian market;

• In the case of opioids, to reduce costs and increase profit margins, they began importing extremely potent synthetic opioids—fentanyl from China—to enhance the narcotic effects of drugs made with less opium, the key raw material used to produce heroin.

Mexican criminal organizations grew rapidly while cocaine was the dominant drug in the U.S. market. But by the early 21st century, in addition to continuing their large-scale cocaine operations, these organizations had also become the most widely present across the entire international drug trade chain, due to their deep involvement in the expanding markets for opioids and synthetic drugs.

The growth and consolidation of power among some of the most dominant Mexican criminal groups was driven in large part by brutal confrontations between former business allies of the now-defunct Guadalajara Cartel, as they fought for control of two kinds of strategic nodes within Mexico.

The many massacres and killings that have taken place in Mexico from the early 21st century to the present stem from the struggle for control over regions where key drug-production resources are concentrated, and from disputes over the key transit zones for smuggling drugs into the United States.

Many of the massacres that occurred in the states of Guerrero, Michoacán, Durango, and Sinaloa—such as the Durango Massacres (340 dead), Zinapécuaro Massacre (20 dead), San José de Gracia Massacre (11 dead), Celaya Massacre (11 dead), Chilapa Massacre (10 dead), Aguililla Clashes (14 dead), and the Tanhuato Clash (43 dead), among many others—were the result of battles for control over local illicit operations: control of opium fields, production of heroin, amphetamines and methamphetamines, illegal extraction of natural resources, and extortion rackets.

In contrast, the bloody events in the states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas—such as the San Fernando Massacre, Tamaulipas (72 dead), the “second” San Fernando Massacre (193 dead), Camargo Massacre (19 dead), Tijuana Massacre (13 dead), Villas de Salvárcar Massacre, Ciudad Juárez (16 dead), and the recent Ensenada Massacre, Baja California (10 dead)—revolved around criminal activities specific to those areas: control of cities close to the border and of the border itself for drug smuggling, human trafficking, forced labor, sexual exploitation, contraband, and extortion.

The strategic nodes—productive and logistical—that exist in Mexico are nothing more than the geographic, natural, industrial, logistical, and commercial enclaves that Mexican criminal organizations must control if they wish to maintain a strong presence in the international drug trade.

ARGENTINA, ITS NODES AND THE LIMITED DOMESTIC MARKET

Reports from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) over the past two decades have shown a year-over-year increase in the number of small and modern laboratories used for the manufacture of synthetic drugs in Europe. In countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Germany, in 2020 alone, law enforcement agencies detected 213 clandestine laboratories dedicated to the production of amphetamines and methamphetamines.

Ten years later, in those same countries, small laboratories were discovered finishing the production of cocaine hydrochloride. Criminal organizations involved in the trafficking and trade of this drug began importing cocaine base paste from South America and completing its processing much closer to European domestic markets.

By purchasing a product of lower volume and added value than cocaine—and finishing production near consumer markets—logistics costs are reduced and profit margins expand. The latest major raid linked to one of these laboratories took place in April 2023. Despite being located in a small house in Galicia, Spain, the lab had the operational capacity to finish producing 200 kilograms of cocaine per day.

Technological developments and changes in production models have fostered the geographic decentralization of drug manufacturing sites, reducing costs and risks while increasing profits.

In Argentina—like in Europe, Africa, and much of Asia—neither the coca leaf shrub nor the opium poppy is cultivated. Nor are the chemical precursors necessary for synthetic drug production manufactured locally. Drugs cannot be produced in Argentina without obtaining the required resources abroad—and yet drugs are produced in Argentina.

For nearly 20 years, laboratories have been detected in Argentina dedicated to completing the processing of cocaine base paste and/or manufacturing synthetic drugs. In 2005, the Secretariat for the Fight against Drug Trafficking (SEDRONAR) reported that 28 such labs were dismantled in that year alone—seven times the average number uncovered five years prior.

Due to its geographic location and economic structure, two types of criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking operate in Argentina: those aiming to control strategic logistical nodes and those focused on dominating the most lucrative retail drug markets within the country, referred to here as strategic commercial nodes.

Every country in the world has strategic nodes, but Argentina’s stand out in three key ways compared to Mexico:

• Strategic logistical nodes in relation to the international drug market in Argentina do not border any high-profit markets, such as the United States, Europe, or several Asian countries. Criminal organizations based in Argentina and oriented toward international trafficking operate primarily in relation to European drug markets, which are more than 10,000 kilometers away.

• Argentina’s strategic logistical nodes for international drug commerce are the ports located along the so-called Hidrovía (62 private and 17 public ports), as well as many of the ports along the Atlantic coastline (12 public and 9 private). In contrast, Mexico’s key logistical nodes are the cities closest to its land border with the United States—such as Tijuana, Mexicali, San Luis, Nogales, Ciudad Juárez, Ciudad Acuña, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Matamoros.

• Around Argentina’s strategic logistical nodes, some of the country’s most lucrative internal drug markets have developed—Buenos Aires, Greater Buenos Aires, Rosario, Zárate, Mar del Plata, etc.—its strategic commercial nodes. These cities or regions are where criminal organizations vie for control of the domestic drug trade. Organizations focused on international trafficking show little or no interest in those domestic markets. Conversely, around Mexico’s production and logistical nodes, although there are also lucrative national markets often controlled by smaller organizations not directly involved in international drug trafficking, these smaller groups are under tight control by international cartels.

The role of criminal organizations involved in international drug trafficking differs sharply from that of those disputing control over domestic markets. While many of the most lucrative local drug markets—strategic commercial nodes—overlap geographically with logistical ones, the groups controlling the latter appear, for now, not to interfere in conflicts between local drug dealers, who are responsible for the majority of violent incidents in areas such as Greater Buenos Aires, Mar del Plata, Santa Fe, Entre Ríos, Corrientes, Córdoba, and Mendoza—incidents that generate significant public and political attention.

Argentina’s domestic drug market is extremely small—not only in relation to the global market, but also compared to the national drug markets of other South American countries (such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay), North America (Mexico, the United States, and Canada), and all of Europe. Nevertheless, Argentina's domestic market still exists and generates profit.

These differences stem from the number of potential consumers in each country and—most importantly—the exchange rate differences between local currencies and the U.S. dollar.

All the elements necessary for drug production—as well as the drugs themselves—are traded internationally and interregionally in U.S. dollars, the dominant currency in both legal and illegal global commerce. The euro is also commonly used in criminal activities due to its high-denomination banknotes, but outside of the U.S. and the EU, retail drug transactions are usually carried out in national currencies.

In Argentina, the largest demographic sector in the domestic drug market comprises individuals aged 15 to 64—about 30 million people. Of that population, 2.6%—around 780,000 people—are estimated to have used cocaine in 2021, according to the UNODC. Mexico’s domestic cocaine market is also relatively small, though proportionally larger than Argentina’s. With just over 85 million people in that same age range, and a reported usage rate of 0.6% in 2001, Mexico had an estimated 510,000 cocaine users.

These figures suggest that Argentina and Mexico have similarly scaled domestic cocaine markets in relative terms. However, the price difference is stark: a gram of cocaine sells for an average of $17.84 USD in Mexico, while in Argentina it sells for less than half that—about $7.46 USD.

THE NEED FOR A DIAGNOSIS AND A (NON-)SYNTHESIS

Argentina’s policies regarding the social phenomenon of organized crime—and more specifically in relation to drug trafficking—are often misguidedly compartmentalized, which demonstrates a persistent lack of understanding of the phenomenon. And in the face of this recurring failure to develop a genuine diagnosis, governments have proposed inconsistent responses to address the issue. These measures often range from altering prison sentences for individuals involved in criminal organizations, to arbitrarily deploying federal security forces in the most profitable and conflict-prone centers of the national drug market.

Since the return to democracy, successive governments have formulated proposals that, in most cases, are electoral in nature, repeated ineffectively from one administration to the next, and only occasionally supported by backing for prevention and treatment programs for individuals with substance use issues—programs usually sustained and promoted by social and religious organizations.

The misguided eagerness to draw parallels between the distinct realities of Mexico and Argentina is perhaps the clearest indication of a lack of understanding of the phenomenon—and it may even prove dangerous. Mexico’s geographic proximity to the largest drug market in the world, its control over territories rich in the plant-based raw materials used to manufacture the most in-demand drugs worldwide, and the internal structure of its criminal organizations are all fundamental differences when compared to Argentina.

The differences regarding strategic nodes are also striking. In Mexico, the nodes are both productive and logistical. The productive ones thrive in regions where raw materials for drug manufacturing are concentrated—materials that fuel North American, European, Asian, and Oceanic markets. The logistical nodes, meanwhile, develop in areas that must be controlled due to their key geographical position, necessary for ensuring the flow of drugs into the United States.

In Argentina, strategic nodes are logistical and commercial. The logistical nodes are spaces that need to be controlled in order to send drugs toward European drug markets. In contrast, the strategic commercial nodes are large urban centers and their immediate peripheries—some of which also overlap with logistical nodes—where the supply and demand for drugs is concentrated.

The increasingly frequent and devastating international crises—contractual, migratory, social, financial, and health-related—are, in most cases, associated with and driven by organized criminal activity. This convergence of crises impacts the most vulnerable citizens around the world and the governments that lack a proper understanding of the phenomenon. Additionally, weak states are left with outdated and ineffective tools that can do little more than attempt to resist the advance of the phenomenon.

There is an urgent need for a proper diagnosis, followed by a consensus on that analysis and a coordinated set of measures regarding how to address this issue. Only then can states develop or adopt new tools and implement new actions to generate new responses. The exponential growth of organized crime globally and its increasing economic influence represents one of the gravest imminent threats to democracy.

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