HISTORY AND TOOLS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE MAFIA

A new strategy against the mafia

Argentina, like most countries in the world, is highly exposed to the actions of mafia-style organizations and to the deep social consequences they generate. So far, the State has failed to provide effective—let alone innovative—responses to this phenomenon. In Italy, however, with the support of organized civil society and broad sectors of the political and judicial systems, efforts have been underway for nearly seventy years to develop a series of logical, modern, and interconnected tools to confront mafia organizations and to restore key democratic values that are eroded by mafia activity—chief among them, the public’s trust in the State. Argentina is increasingly paying attention to these Italian experiences and is beginning to design and adapt some of those tools for domestic implementation. Recognizing both the similarities and the differences through the lens of history may be the first step toward synergistic learning. What follows is a brief overview of that history and a look at some of those tools.

The first Spanish translation of the Italian Anti-Mafia Code emerged from a specific context: the launch of the Bien Restituido (Returned Goods) project and the need to promote the social reuse of assets seized and confiscated from organized crime in Argentina. But to fully grasp the meaning and purpose of this version of the Code, it is also important to understand the context and needs from which it originally arose in its country of origin.

Before delving into the substance, I will pause for a few methodological considerations. First, in this essay, the term criminal organization will be used interchangeably with mafia or mafia-type organization. Although the term mafia association in Italy has not only conceptual but also legal connotations, for the purposes of this article, no specific distinction or characterization will be necessary.

Second, given my academic background in History, this writing will follow a chronological structure, since I believe that historical analysis—particularly in the case of Argentina—provides essential tools for understanding social realities.

The mafia is a social phenomenon that, among its many facets, takes the form of a planned and structured organization aimed at committing criminal acts for economic gain. Mafia-type organizations in Italy trace their origins to the second half of the 19th century in a region as unique as it is diverse, beginning shortly after the fall of Roman influence. These include the Camorra in Campania, the ’Ndrangheta in Calabria, and the Cosa Nostra in Sicily—all born amid a crumbling feudal system where old production relations had not yet died and new ones had yet to be born. Among these, the Cosa Nostra is perhaps the most studied and documented, originating in Sicily but taking its name from its criminal counterparts across the Atlantic in the United States.

Until the 1960s, mafia activity in Italy focused on control, extortion, and smuggling of agricultural goods. After World War II, the geographic and economic presence of mafia activity shifted along with Italy’s broader political and economic transformations. These included:

• The rise and decades-long dominance of the Christian Democratic Party (DC),

• U.S. political and military involvement in Italian affairs due to the strength of the Italian Communist Party, and

  
  

• The post-war reconstruction under a Keynesian development model, which expanded the scope of economic policy and shifted the country’s economic center of gravity from the countryside to the cities.

Global developments also influenced the growth of international criminal organizations, especially the Italian ones:

• A surge in demand for opiate drugs—especially heroin—in the United States,

• The loss of control over the heroin market by French criminal groups, and

• The rise of Italian mafias—particularly Cosa Nostra—who leveraged their U.S.-based networks to take over the heroin trade from the Middle East.

The expansion of the drug market—not only in the U.S.—enabled the Cosa Nostra to amass enormous profits. These economic gains flowed back to Sicily, fueling two major challenges: internal conflict and a surplus of untraceable cash.

The first challenge was “resolved” in typical criminal fashion—with gunpowder and blood. The second was addressed by deepening ties with financial institutions, northern Italy’s modern industries, and national political actors in Rome. These relationships allowed the Sicilian mafia to reinvest its illicit capital both on the island and in certain sectors of the Italian economy. Through “legitimate-looking investments,” the Cosa Nostra increased its profits while reinforcing ties with corrupt elements of the state, which in return for bribes, ensured impunity.

As the mafia’s system of criminal governance expanded and consolidated, Italy began to formulate legislation to confront organized crime through democratic means. The first major step came in 1962–63 with the creation of the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission, which remains active to this day.

From this commission emerged the first detailed judicial and academic reports. These sought to demonstrate the actual existence of the mafia phenomenon—despite skepticism from within the commission itself—and to characterize its structure in order to develop appropriate strategies for intervention.

One of the most important and impactful reports, both within and beyond the Commission, was issued in 1976. This minority report, authored by parliamentarians Cesare Terranova and Pio La Torre and supported by only six other deputies and senators, explicitly pointed to links between leading Sicilian DC politicians and the Cosa Nostra. For the first time, it also articulated what would later become the core of Italy’s anti-mafia criminal policy: targeting the profits.

One of the earliest laws addressing criminal organizations—without specifically naming mafia-type groups—was Law No. 1423/56, titled "Preventive Measures Against Persons Dangerous to Public Safety and Morality", enacted in 1956 and repealed in 2011.

Nearly a decade later, Law No. 575/65 was passed, introducing provisions to allow preventive measures against persons suspected of mafia-related offenses. These laws, together with the reports from the Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission and the political and union work of Pio La Torre, culminated in the drafting of a legislative proposal that transformed Italy’s fight against organized crime.

In 1980, then-deputy Pio La Torre—alongside Interior Minister Virgilio Rognoni—sought to criminalize mafia association and introduce the legal authority to seize assets and property obtained through criminal activities. This marked a turning point in the Italian state’s legal framework to combat mafia organizations.

Article 1 of the proposed law defined the crime of mafia-type association.

Art. 416 bis. “Anyone who takes part in a mafia-type association composed of three or more persons shall be punished with imprisonment from three to six years. Those who promote, direct, or organize the association shall be punished, solely for that reason, with imprisonment from four to nine years. The association is considered mafia-type when its members make use of the intimidating power of the group’s associative bond and of the resulting condition of submission and silence to commit crimes, to acquire—directly or indirectly—control over economic activities, concessions, authorizations, contracts, and public services, or to obtain unfair advantages or benefits for themselves or others. (...) If the economic activities that the members intend to control are financed, in whole or in part, by the proceeds, products, or profits of crimes, the penalties established in the preceding paragraphs are increased by one third to one half. The confiscation of items used or intended for committing the crime, and of items constituting its price, product, or profit, or that are used in committing it, shall always be mandatory. (...) The provisions of this article shall also apply to the Camorra and to other associations, regardless of local name, which pursue aims similar to those of mafia-type associations by making use of the intimidating power of their associative bond.”

Article 31 of the same bill introduced confiscation as part of the punitive sentence:

“(...) A conviction shall be followed by the confiscation of assets acquired for any reason, as well as the consideration received for assets sold for any reason. In cases where it is not possible to confiscate the acquired assets or the proceeds of sold assets, the judge shall order the confiscation, of an equivalent value, of sums of money, goods, or other benefits in the possession of the subjects referred to in the first paragraph of Article 30.”

The explicit criminalization of acts committed as part of a mafia-type organization, along with the legal instrument of asset confiscation—including product, profit, or equivalent—marked the first serious concern for mafia organizations in the face of state authority.

Due to his persistent work in shaping judicial, political, and social efforts to combat organized crime, Pio La Torre became a target of Cosa Nostra. Two years after presenting the bill against mafia organizations and leading a fierce campaign opposing the installation of a NATO missile base in Sicily, La Torre was murdered on April 30, 1982, in Palermo, his hometown, along with a fellow party member.

After La Torre’s murder, the slaughter continued. In an apparent attempt to respond to the spiraling situation, national authorities sent General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, of the Carabinieri, to Palermo as Prefect, tasked with halting the bloodshed. Just four months later, Dalla Chiesa and his wife were assassinated by hitmen sent by the Cosa Nostra leadership. The outrage caused by this new killing compelled national politicians to respond swiftly: on September 13, 1982, just ten days later, the Italian Parliament passed Law No. 646/1982, the bill introduced two years earlier by Pio La Torre and Virgilio Rognoni.

In 1983, magistrate Rocco Chinnici assembled a group of prosecutors and judges to form a special team dedicated exclusively to investigating and proving that Cosa Nostra’s criminal activities were diverse, organized, and committed by a flexible but organic entity. The original team included Chinnici himself and magistrates Giovanni Falcone, Paolo Borsellino, and Giuseppe Di Lello. In June of that year, Chinnici was murdered by a car bomb outside his home. He was succeeded by Antonino Caponnetto, a magistrate from Florence, who added Leonardo Guarnotta to the team.

The investigations of this anti-mafia pool culminated in 1987, when a court—on the basis of the indictment and trial motion led by Falcone and Borsellino—convicted more than 350 mafiosi in the Maxi Trial, imposing a total of 2,665 years of prison time, not including life sentences. The mafia’s response, along with that of corrupt political sectors, was swift. Caponnetto had to return to Florence and was expected to be succeeded by Giovanni Falcone. However, to the shock and dismay of many, a judge nearing retirement with no experience in anti-mafia investigations was appointed instead—reportedly due to a scheme orchestrated by political and judicial sectors. This led to the rapid dismantling of the successful anti-mafia pool.

In the following years, a determined part of the Italian judiciary continued to investigate Cosa Nostra, and following the Maxi Trial convictions, testimonies from pentiti—repentant mafia collaborators—began to reveal the deep complicity of business and political sectors with the mafia. This triggered a climate of confusion, accusations, lies, and more assassinations.

The central figure in the fight against the mafia was Giovanni Falcone, and many attacks were directed at him. Faced with mounting obstacles to his investigations, he accepted the position of Director of Criminal Affairs at the Ministry of Justice in Rome. There, he proposed and achieved the creation of two key agencies: the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA) and the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia (DNA). In 1991, through Decree-Laws No. 345 and No. 367, these agencies were established to enhance and coordinate judicial investigations. The DIA currently includes members of the Polizia di Stato, Guardia di Finanza, and Carabinieri. The DNA, now the DNAA (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo), is headed by the Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor, appointed by the High Council of the Judiciary with the consent of the Minister of Justice.

The confirmation of the Maxi Trial sentences by the Court of Cassation unleashed the fury of the top Cosa Nostra bosses. According to pentiti, at the end of 1991, a meeting was held in the Sicilian town of Enna between top mafia leaders and, allegedly, corrupt members of the intelligence services. They agreed—or authorized—a hit list targeting specific officials. The first to be murdered was Salvo Lima, a high-ranking Sicilian politician who acted as a liaison between Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and Cosa Nostra, and who had failed to fulfill his promise to overturn the Maxi Trial verdicts.

Next, Cosa Nostra planned and executed the assassination of the top anti-mafia figures. On May 23, 1992, using a sophisticated explosive device placed beneath a highway, three mafiosi murdered Giovanni Falcone, his wife and magistrate Francesca Morvillo, and three of their bodyguards. Fifty-seven days later, knowing he too would be killed, Paolo Borsellino was assassinated by a car bomb along with five of his escorts. In those final weeks, Borsellino publicly denounced the mafia’s political and business ties.

The killings triggered widespread outrage across Italy and abroad—particularly in the United States, Spain, and France—and forced the Italian state to implement measures previously proposed by Falcone to intensify the fight against the mafia.

Between the murders of Falcone and Borsellino, Decree-Law No. 306/92 amended the special prison regime Article 41bis. This decree, which became law after Borsellino’s death, allowed for the suspension of inmates’ rights to prevent the transmission of orders from prison to the outside world. The stricter regime, still in force today, denies early release for mafia convicts unless they collaborate with the judiciary. It imposes permanent isolation, constant monitoring, and forbids physical contact with family during visits.

In early 1993, Toto Riina, Cosa Nostra’s top boss, was arrested after over a decade on the run. But the mafia continued its escalation of violence, exporting its extortion mechanisms to mainland Italy. On May 27, a car bomb in Florence killed five people. On July 28, two car bombs exploded in Rome, injuring 22 people. On January 23, 1994, security forces dismantled an explosive device planted at Rome’s Olympic Stadium before a football match between Lazio and Udinese.

Facing a wave of investigations and arrests—some of which suggested betrayal within Cosa Nostra’s new leadership—the mafia decided to change strategy. It continued its criminal activities under a low profile, avoiding attacks or murders that might draw media or political attention, but still tormented everyday life. In this apparent calm, social organizations kept working not only to legally dismantle the mafia, but also to undermine it culturally and economically.

Fourteen years later, based on a popular initiative by the social organization Libera, Law No. 109/1996 was passed. This law allowed confiscated mafia assets—under the Rognoni-La Torre law—to be repurposed for social use by the state or civil society. To date, over 15,000 properties have been transformed into offices for public agencies and social cooperatives. Lands once owned by mafia members are now used by organic farming cooperatives that also promote social and labor inclusion for marginalized groups. Large buildings have become public libraries, shelters for women victims of violence, housing for the elderly, and sports and educational centers for youth in underserved neighborhoods.

What makes the experience of social reuse in Italy particularly noteworthy is that it forms part of a virtuous cycle of empowerment and collaboration among society, victims, and the State. This cycle helps restore public trust in state institutions, a trust that had been seriously undermined by mafia actions. Thanks to a law promoted by social organizations—backed by over one million signatures—business associations, trade unions, professional organizations, and religious leaders from various faiths also became involved in this virtuous process, which continues to transform spaces of illegality and pain into places of work and solidarity.

Another key step in building and implementing tools to confront organized crime in Italy was Law No. 4/2010, which established the National Agency for the Management and Allocation of Assets Seized and Confiscated from Organized Crime (ANBSC). Through this agency, the nearly 60,000 properties, five companies, and hundreds of thousands of movable assets seized from mafia organizations are preserved, managed, and correctly allocated. The agency’s main office is currently located in Rome, in a confiscated mafia property.

After 46 years of efforts by broad sectors of the judiciary, politics, and civil society, Italy undertook the process of organizing and unifying the large number of anti-mafia laws and regulations enacted over that period. In 2011, Decree Law No. 159/2011 was enacted, officially creating the Italian Anti-Mafia Code.

The first fifteen articles of the Code set out personal preventive measures, designed to prevent crimes from being committed by individuals suspected of belonging to mafia organizations. Articles 16 to 34-ter outline the procedures for seizing and confiscating assets that may be the product or benefit of mafia-related activities. Articles 34-ter to 54 describe the system for custody and use of seized or confiscated assets. The following articles, up to Article 114, regulate the management of anti-mafia documentation generated during investigations and set forth procedures for dissolving and administrating local governments infiltrated by the mafia. Finally, the Code includes general provisions governing the functioning of the DNAA, the DIA, and the ANBSC.

The need to translate the Italian Anti-Mafia Code emerged in the context of launching the Bien Restituido (Returned Assets) project in Argentina, led by Libera - Associations, Names and Numbers Against the Mafias. The project aims to transform criminal assets into common goods, allowing them to be reused socially and economically by both the state and grassroots organizations. Social reuse is a practice that enables the State to fulfill its duty to repair the harm suffered by both direct victims of criminal activities and indirect victims—namely civil society as a whole, especially its most vulnerable sectors.

The first Spanish translation of the Italian Anti-Mafia Code has served as a reference point for deepening understanding of the legislation and practical implementation of anti-mafia policies by the Italian state and civil society. Making the Code available in Spanish has opened the door for all Spanish-speaking countries to access one of the central elements of an innovative public policy approach to a social phenomenon that, now and in the coming years, will be one of the greatest global challenges alongside climate change.

The social reuse of assets from organized crime is an effective tool that, in Italy, serves a dual purpose: on one hand, it provides reparation to both direct and indirect victims of mafia violence; on the other, it allows the State to regain public trust, which is essential to uphold the democratic contract. At the same time, it undermines the economic base of mafia organizations, which is their only true source of survival.

In Argentina, and after three years of work, legislative bill No. 6801-D-2022 was introduced by over twenty lawmakers from eight different political parties. The bill was drafted by more than forty social, judicial, and religious organizations, and proposes the creation of an agency to manage assets seized and confiscated by the federal justice system from organized crime. These assets would then be socially reused by the State and social organizations, thus replicating the Italian model.

LA HISTORIA Y LAS HERRAMIENTAS EN LA LUCHA CONTRA LA MAFIA __ THE HISTORY AND THE TOOLS IN.

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